

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DOHA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T SANAA 0378

LIMDIS

BAGHDAD BY POUCH

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SUBJECT: ADVISORY ROLES OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES IN YAR

REF: A) STATE 029563; B) STATE A-74 OF JAN. 6

1. SUMMARY: THE UK HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN AN ADVISORY
ROLE IN NORTH YEMEN. THIS FUNCTION HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN PER-
FORMED BY THE EGYPTIANS AND LATER THE SOVIETS, WHO TODAY HAVE
119 MILITARY ADVISORS COMMANDED BY A MAJOR GENERAL IN YAR. THIS
LARGE SOVIET CONTINGENT, HOWEVER, HAS CONTRIBUTED LITTLE OR

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NOTHING IN THE WAY OF REAL ADVANCEMENT FOR THE YAR ARMED

FORCES DURING THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS. THE MOST VITAL ADVISORY EFFORT TODAY IN YAR IS COMING FROM JORDAN, WHICH HAS ONLY IN THE PAST WEEK EXPANDED AN ADVISORY GROUP OF SOME 10 MEN TO AN APPROXIMATE TOTAL OF 43. THESE MEN ARE WORKING IN KEY POSITIONS IN THE OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL STRUCTURE OF THE YAR ARMED FORCES AND ARE IDEALLY SUITED TO PAVE THE WAY FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN AND PARTICULARLY US CONCEPTS AND EQUIPMENT INTO NORTH YEMEN. SAUDI ARABIA, WHICH VISUALIZES A PREDOMINANT ROLE FOR ITSELF IN NORTH YEMEN, IS POSSIBLY NOT AS ENTHUSIASITC ABOUT JORDAN'S ADVISORY EFFORTS AS IT COULD BE. NONETHELESS THE SAUDIS ARE LIKELY TO GO ALONG, RECOGNIZING THAT FOR MOMENT THE JORDANIANS ARE FAR MORE PREFERABLE THAN THE SOVIETS OR MORE RADICAL ARABS. THE SOVIETS ARE STRONGLY RESISTING THIS GROWING JORDANIAN ADVISORY PRESENCE, SO FAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THE PRESENT JORDANIAN EFFORT IS LARGELY FINANCED BY THE YEMENIS THEMSELVES. IN THE LONG RUN, HOWEVER, JORDAN MAY WELL NEED OUTSIDE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO CARRY ON ITS EFFORT. IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE USG MAY BE ASKED TO ASSIST IN THIS AREA IN TIME IF JORDAN IS EXPECTED TO EFFECT-IVELY PURSUE MUTUALLY AGREED UPON US-JORDANIAN GOALS IN YAR. END SUMMARY.

2. COMMENTS CONCERNING INSPECTORS RECOMMENDATION NO. 18 RE UK AND OTHER COUNTRY ADVISORY ROLES IN YAR.

A. THE SOVIET UNION IS THE ONLY COUNTRY, OTHER THAN JORDAN, WHICH PERFORMS A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE IN YAR. THE YAR ARMED FORCES IN EXISTENCE TODAY WERE EFFECTIVELY CREATED DURING THE 1960'S. THESE FORCES INITIALLY BENEFITED FROM EGYPTIAN TRAINING, BOTH IN COUNTRY AND IN EGYPT, AS WELL AS A SOVIET ADVISORY EFFORT IN COUNTRY AND EXTENSIVE TRAINING IN THE USSR. ALL THAT REMAINS OF THIS EARLIER EFFORT TODAY IS 119 SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN YAR WHO DO LITTLE MORE THAN MONITOR YAR ARMED FORCES ACTIVITIES AND CONTRIBUTE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO THE SUBSTANTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.

B. SAUDI ARABIA IS ONLY NOW ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO THE ADVISOR BUSINESS IN YAR, NOT WITH ANY GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS. THE NORTH YEMENIS REMAIN WARY OF TOO DEEP A SAUDI INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, AND FRANKLY HAVE REXERVATIONS
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CONCERNING THE SAUDI CAPABILITY TO FUNCTION AS MILITARY ADVISORS.

C. THE UK PROVIDES ONE SECURITY SPECIALIST WHO ADVISES THE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR SECURITY OFFICIALS ON INTERNAL SECURITY MATTERS. THERE IS NO DIRECT BRITISH MILITARY ADVISORY EFFORT IN NORTH YEMEN.

D. FOR A TIME IRAQI MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ALSO ACTIVE IN YAR, BUT SO LONG AS THE PRESENT REGIME LASTS THERE IS VERY LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF THE REEMERGENCE OF IRAQIS ON THE SCENE.

3. COMMENTS CONCERNING INSPECTORS' RECOMMENDATION NO. 20 RE JORDAN'S ADVISORY ROLE IN YAR.

A. THE UNIQUE FACT WITH RESPECT TO JORDAN'S MILITARY ADVISORY ROLE IN YAR AS COMPARED WITH A SIMILAR ROLE IN

THE GULF STATES, IS THAT JORDAN IS NEITHER SUPPLEMENTING NOR COMPETING WITH UK OR OTHER FRIENDLY (TO US) COUNTRY ADVISORS--WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE SAUDI ARABIANS.

B. DURING THE PAST YEAR THE JORDANIANS, WHO ENJOY A GOOD PROFESSIONAL REPUTATION AND ARE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS HAVING NO SELFISH TERRITORIAL OR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES IN YAR, HAVE HAD SIX OFFICERS AND FIVE ENLISTED MEN IN YAR. THIS GROUP INCLUDED A LTC GHQ OPERATIONS ADVISOR, A LTC GHQ INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR, A LTC SALADIN ARMORED CAR ADVISOR, AND THREE CAPTAINS OF THE ENGINEERS WORKING IN THE BAB AL-MANDEB AREA. ON 11 FEB 1975 APPROXIMATELY 37 MORE OFFICERS AND NCO'S ARRIVED IN YAR. THESE MEN WILL BE CONCENTRATED IN THE GHQ WHERE IT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR AND THE GHQ OPERATIONS ADVISOR TO HAVE A QUALIFIED JORDANIAN ADVISOR IN EVERY STAFF SECTION. THE GOJ HAS AGREED TO COVER THE COST OF THE ORIGINAL SIX JORDANIAN OFFICERS IN COUNTRY FOR A TWO-YEAR PERIOD AT A COST OF JD 50 THOUSAND WHILE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THE YEMENIS WILL COVER THE COST OF THE REMAINDER OF THE JORDANIANS.

C. THE BIGGEST OBSTACLE FACING THE NASCENT JORDANIAN ADVISORY SECRET

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EFFORT IS A SOVIET UNWILLINGNESS TO LET GO. SENIOR YAR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ARE SUBJECTED TO REPEATED SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO UNDERMINE THE JORDANIAN EFFORT, AN EFFORT WHICH IF SUCCESSFUL, MAY WELL BRING DOWN THE CURTAIN ON THE SOVIET ADVISORY PRESENCE IN YAR.

D. A SECOND OBSTACLE TO THE JORDANIAN DESIRE TO CARRY OUT THIS ADVISORY FUNCTION IS A LOW-KEYED, BUT REAL SAUDI RESENTMENT THAT ONCE AGAIN THE JORDANIANS HAVE BEEN PREFERRED OVER THEM. THERE IS ALSO SAUDI SUSPICION OF BOTH THE JORDANIANS AND THE YEMENIS BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE HASEMITE AND YEMENI IRREDENTISM TO THE JEJAZ AND THE ASIR RESPECTIVELY. THEREFORE, THIS BRINGS US TO A THIRD PROBLEM FACING A LONG-TERM JORDANIAN ADVISORY EFFORT IN YEMEN, I.E.,

FINANCING OF THE JORDANIAN EFFORT, WHICH IS BEYOND JORDAN'S OWN LIMITED RESOURCES AND WHICH MAY IN PART HAVE TO COME FROM SOME QUARTER OTHER THAN SAUDI ARABIA, PRESUMABLY FROM THE U.S.

E. IF THE YAR ARMED FORCES ARE TO EVER PULL THEMSELVES OUT OF THEIR PRESENT STAGNANT RUT BORNE OUT OF FRUSTRATION OVER INSUFFICIENT, INADEQUATE EQUIPMENT, NON-PROGRESSIVE TRAINING, AND THE DEAD WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET ADVISORY EFFORT, THEN THE YAR DOES NEED THE ASSISTANCE OF POSITIVELY COMMITTED FOREIGN ADVISORS. FURTHERMORE, IF THE YAR, THE US AND SAUDI ARABIA ARE SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO THE MODERNIZATION AND WESTERNIZATION OF YAR ARMED FORCES, THESE ADVISORS SHOULD BE SCHOOLED IN PRIMARILY US ORGANIZATIONAL, OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL PROCEDURES. THE JORDANIANS COMPLETELY FILL THE BILL. IT ALSO BECOMES APPARENT THAT THERE IS NOT A BETTER ALTERNATIVE IN THE AREA WHEN ONE CONSIDERS JORDANIAN: (1) DISINVOLVEMENT FROM THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF YEMEN; (2) LINGUISTIC COMPATIBILITY; AND (3) DEMONSTRATED ABILITY TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE MODERN FIGHTING FORCE IN SPITE OF THEIR OWN MANPOWER AND MATERIAL LIMITATIONS.

F. THAT THE JORDANIANS ARE WILLING TO ASSUME THIS ADVISORY ROLE IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE USG IN YAR HAS BEEN CLEARLY STATED BY JORDANINA CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES IN YAR, GIVEN OF COURSE, THE NECESSARY FINANCIAL SUPPORT. IT
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IS ALSO CLEAR THAT GIVEN THE VESTED INTERESTS AND PETTY JEALOUSIES OF THE MORE WEALTHY ARABIAN PENINSULA STATES, THE USG MAY WELL HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO ASSUME SOME OF THE COST OF A LONG TERM JORDANINA PROGRAM IF A FIXED POLICY OBJECTIVE WITH REGARD TO YEMEN'S ARMED FORCES IS TO BE UNWAVERINGLY PURSUED.
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